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Articles

THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT AND THE UNCITRAL MODEL
PROCUREMENT LAW:
A VIEW FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION

John Linarelli∗

ABSTRACT



Two of the most significant efforts to bring municipal
procurement institutions up to international standards are the
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction
and Services. Though the Model Law has had limited adoptions, it
enjoys global influence as a source of norms and practices for
good public procurement. The GPA, also reflective of international
standards, seems to be on the rise, as more WTO members elect to
become GPA contracting parties. This article explores two aspects
of these instruments. First, the article explores how the Model Law
promotes efficient public procurement. It explains how the ongoing
revisions of the Model Law, in particular in the area of electronic
Professor of Law, University of La Verne College of Law, Ontario, California USA,
john_linarelli@ulv.edu. This paper was presented at the Second Annual International Conference
on Policies and Laws of Asia and WTO: Rules, Practices and Policies of Government Procurement,
held at the National Taiwan University College of Law on July 27-28, 2006. I am grateful for
conference funding from the National Taiwan University College of Law. Many thanks to the
various conference participants who provided valuable comments on the paper. I also wish to
express my gratitude to my Dean, Donald Dunn, for supporting my research through the University
of La Verne College of Law Summer Research Stipend Program.
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reverse auctions, continues to promote efficiency in procurement
systems. Second, the article explores how the GPA promotes
efficiency in its non-market access provisions, but that its market
access provisions permit governments to take the fairness of
procurement policies into account, through socio-economic
programs. Only efficiency is a value at the transnational level, and
fairness is a concern only of municipal governments at this time.
The GPA thus imperfectly facilitates a mix of efficiency and
fairness policies in the procurement systems of the GPA
contracting parties. Only GPA contracting parties with significant
market leverage, who can open up substantial procurement
markets while still maintaining protected socio-economic
procurements, can effectively promote both fairness and efficiency
in their procurement systems. Of course, what one country might
characterize as fairness, another might characterize as rentseeking protection, and it is well accepted that while trade
restrictive policies often seem laudable in theory, they can be
difficult to implement and harmful in practice.

KEYWORDS: public procurement; world trade; law and development; relation
of economics to social values; new institutional economics; distributive justice

I. INTRODUCTION
Public procurement law and policy exists in a nether world in terms of
inquiry about its relationship to international trade and the economic
growth of states. Much of the activity in procurement law reform in
countries working to improve their procurement systems is undertaken at
the level of the practitioner’s art. The focus is on action and on the
immediate practicalities of procurement reform. It is reminiscent of the
substantial legislative activity in the 1980s and 1990s to combat “fraud,
waste and abuse” in the United States federal procurement system. How
could any U.S. congressman be against fighting fraud, waste and abuse?
The result was a “ratchet effect”1 in production of ever more procurement
1

See generally William E. Kovacic, Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government
Procurement, 25 POL’Y SCI. 29 (1992).
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laws, so that what we have in the United States is an overregulated
procurement system that is still inefficient, and regrettably, prone to
corruption.2 Many of us who work and think about procurement law and
policy learned our craft while doing it, either in actual purchasing or in law
practice representing government or contractor clients. As a body of
experts we thus focus on implementation of procurement reform and
liberalization. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the strategic aspects of
public procurement law reform and liberalization of public procurement
markets at the WTO level. I examine some justifications for procurement
reform and liberalization to support a consensus on why reform is
important and what it is supposed to do. Public procurement is a means to
an end. Even when public procurement reform is seen as part of the project
to promote good governance, the higher goal of good governance is a
means to an end as well.3 The end is about improving the lives of the
citizens of countries, citizens whose scarce funds are used to finance
procurement. It seems uncontroversial to say that public procurement law
and institutions must be efficient, but they must be fair as well, and when
fairness and efficiency conflict, we must recognize that fairness might
come at a social cost. The analysis set forth here requires us to momentarily
separate action from inquiry, and to think about procurement reform and
liberalization principally from the standpoint of inquiry.
What I am getting at here is a view from outside the region. In the
1960s and 1970s, American lawyers, with the financial assistance of the
U.S. government and multilateral institutions, embarked on ambitious
programs to assist developing countries with legal reforms. One of the
leaders of that movement, Stanford Professor John Henry Merryman, wrote
an influential paper, published in 1977, arguing that lawyers spent too
much effort doing law reform projects and insufficient effort inquiring
about the nature and activity of law in developing countries. Merryman
explained:
These characteristics: unfamiliarity with the target culture and
society (including its legal system), innocence of theory,
artificially privileged access to power, and relative immunity to
consequences, have been typical of many law and development
proposals and programs for the third world. Put another way,
we were probably incompetent to propose or execute third
world law and development action, we were encouraged (by our
own self-image, by the foreign assistance psychology and by
2

Steven L. Schooner, A Conversation about Malversation The Post-Millennial U.S. Experience
Combating Corruption in Public Procurement (June 19, 2006) (unpublished draft, on file with the
author).
3
See The World Bank, Poverty Matters, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/gc/governance/
governance.htm (last visited July 5, 2006).
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third-world conditions) to do so, and we did not suffer the
consequences of having done so. The mainstream law and
development movement, dominated by the American legal
style, was bound to fail and has failed.4
By contemporary standards, Merryman’s language may seem off the
mark. We no longer speak of the third world. Moreover, his comments
seem directed at poorer countries than are represented at this conference,
given the rise of the Asian economies. Law and development may not be a
proper subject for this conference. But an important lesson emanates from
Merryman’s words, one which still holds true today. Merryman went on to
say that his findings are not as depressing as they may seem, and that he
recommend we examine, from the standpoint of inquiry, the legal traditions
and social institutions of countries before embarking on reform.5 In sum,
legal scholars should be cautious in recommending reform, and base such
recommendations on good information and a thorough understanding of
context.
This paper proceeds from Merryman’s findings. “Law and
development” is no longer the right name for the field. It is too narrow and
it is misleading. The contemporary focus is on the effect of law on
economic growth, which is improved terminology, but still in need of
improvement because it fails to focus on fairness and distributive justice
concerns. The law and development movement of Merryman’s generation
was too focused on sociological inquiry and on what should be a repudiated
concept of modernization. Law and economics has replaced sociologically
based inquiry as the dominant school of thought, but not without the
introduction of a new set of problems. Economic analysis of law permits us
to ignore important policy questions through a reductionist move of
selecting a discipline to use in the analysis that does not provide the
analytical tools to recognize and answer the questions. With economics as
the dominant paradigm, the focus still is on important issues like, how to
produce an adequate institutional infrastructure to facilitate credit and
business financing, or how to improve courts and the machinery of justice,
or on how to achieve recognition of the informal economy and improve the
4

John Henrry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change On the Origins, Style, Decline
and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 481 (1977); see
generally Francis G. Snyder, Book Review The Failure of “Law and Development” Legal
Imperialism American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 373 (1982);
Elliot Burg, Law and Development A Review of the Literature and a Critique of “Scholars in SelfEstrangement”, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492 (1977); David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in SelfEstrangement Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United
States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
5
Merryman, supra note 4, at 481.
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welfare and economic security of participants in the informal sectors.6
Given that all successful economies are mixed economies,7 however, one of
the weaknesses in looking just to economics for answers is its lack of a
theory of justice. The international financial institutions have begun to
respond to such concerns.8 Economic approaches, which rely solely on
efficiency concepts, are helpful but incomplete. We also have to inquire
about the fairness or justice of a particular law or policy. The fairness or
justice inquiry has to be sensitive to the domestic context in which the
policy will be implemented. Sometimes the result is friction between the
international and domestic. This sort of friction is the locus of concern in
many discussions about globalization.
What has all this got to do with public procurement? We want to have
the complete set of tools to evaluate public procurement from a strategic
policy stance. In section II below, I explain how the transparency
characteristics of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods,
Construction and Services9 promote economic efficiency. In section III, I
explain how the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA),10
while promoting transparency and efficiency in much the same way as the
UNCITRAL Model Law, gives GPA contracting parties the ability to
pursue social justice goals, but also how it limits the ability of contracting
parties to pursue such goals. Section IV concludes the article.

II. EFFICIENCY ASPECTS OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL PROCUREMENT LAW
The economic efficiency of procurement rules is in part the result of
the way they produce transparency in the procurement process.
Transparency, then, relates to the issue of governance. Transparency in
public procurement provides governments, taxpayers, and other interested
6

See, e.g., Nicholas Georgakopolous, Statistics of Legal Infrastructures A Review of the Law and
Finance Literature, 8 AM. J.L. & ECON. 62 (2006); Juan Carlos Butero, Rafael La Porta, Florencio
López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Alexander Volokh, Judicial Reform, 18 WORLD BANK RES.
OBSERVER 61 (2003); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic
Development A Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999); Ross Levine,
Law, Finance and Economic Growth, 8 J. FINAN. INTERMEDIATION 8 (1999); Richard A. Posner,
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (1998);
Heywood Fleisig, Secured Transactions The Power of Collateral, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 44
(June 1996).
7
Robert L. Kuttner, Development, Globalization, and Law, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 19 (2004).
8
See generally Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development Second Generation Reforms
and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2004).
9
The text of the Model Procurement Law can be found at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model.html (last visited July 5, 2006).
10
The text of the GPA can be found at, http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.
htm (last visited July 5, 2006).
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parties with the ability to monitor expenditures of public funds in public
procurement. Transparency also provides procurement officials with
incentives to conduct procurements in best value terms. In this section, I
show how the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law promotes efficiency
and begin to connect the efficiency aspects of the Model Law to good
governance, but first a digression about the WTO.
In the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, the WTO members
established a Working Group on Transparency in Government
Procurement.11 The aim of the Working Group was to determine whether a
new transparency framework agreement could take the place of the GPA.
This aim of the transparency framework agreement was to broaden the
scope of participation in liberalization of procurement markets. Some trade
negotiators and commentators thought that such an agreement could
broaden participation beyond the then narrow “club” membership of the
GPA, by permitting protectionist practices, so long as those practices were
transparent.12 On August 1, 2004, the WTO General Council adopted a
decision in which the transparency negotiations were discontinued.13 The
transparency framework agreement is off the table for the Doha Ministerial
Conference. The official WTO position is that the transparency agreement
is on hold.14 Malaysia was one of the countries instrumental in bringing an
end to the Working Group and eventual negotiations.15 It is particularly
difficult for Malaysia to join any procurement liberalization agreement
unless that agreement permits the kind of substantial preference programs
in public procurement that Malaysia has in place for its majority Malay or
Bumiputera population.16
Though WTO work on the transparency framework agreement is on
hold, there is reason for us to be sanguine about the prospects of moves
toward transparency in public procurement, coming from the work of
UNCITRAL on the Model Procurement Law. The on-hold WTO
transparency framework agreement relates to a larger point about public
procurement, and that is that nearly all of its rules are at least in part
11

World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 13,
1996), 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997).
12
John Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda Law, Economics and International Relations
Theory, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CONTINUING REVOLUTION 235, 241-42 (Sue Arrowsmith & Martin
Trybus eds., Kluwer Law International 2003).
13
Robert D. Anderson, Developments on Public Procurement in the WTO (June 19, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
14
Id.
15
See generally Christopher McCrudden & Stuart G. Gross, WTO Government Procurement Rules
and the Local Dynamics of Procurement Policies A Malaysian Case Study, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151
(2006).
16
Id. at 153.
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justifiable on the basis of transparency, regardless of the legal regime in
which the rules happen to be located.
In this section, I provide a way of thinking about the transparency
aspects of procurement, mainly using the tools of new institutional
economics. Public procurement law is rich in legal rules susceptible to
economic analysis.17 The potentially richest source of economic methods
available for analyzing the structure of legal rules on public procurement is
what economists variously describe as contract theory, principal agent
theory, or the economics of information. The economic toolkit provides
what Laffont and Tirole call “contractible variables” − variables facilitating
the ability of interested parties to monitor procurement practices and
market access.18 Transparency gives interested parties the ability to know
about poor practices in public procurement, as well as trade barriers in
public procurement markets. Transparency relates to both good
procurement practices – in achieving value for money – and to market
access – to understanding how open or closed procurement markets
actually are.
The standard explanation goes as follows.19 A basic question
procurement officials face during the planning stages of a procurement is
what method of procurement should be adopted. Related to this question is
what should be the evaluation criteria by which offers should be judged. In
the legal systems of many countries, and in the UNCITRAL Model
Procurement Law, a range of options exist to deal with these two issues.
These options are usually constrained by certain conditions that must be
met in order to justify reliance on a particular method of procurement or
method of evaluation. As for methods of procurement, governments can
use a very formal approach, such as sealed bidding, a very informal
approach, such as unstructured negotiations with few rules to bind
procurement officials, or an intermediate approach, such as a request for
proposals method of procurement, which permits negotiations but usually
within a highly structured and legalistic format. If sealed bidding is used,
firms submit sealed bids, the government opens the bids for public view on
a predetermined and published date and time, and the government makes
award to the qualified bidder who submits the lowest price or cost and
whose bid does not materially deviate from the government's solicitation of
17

See generally Daniel R Fischel & Alan O Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract,
1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 343 (1999).
18
See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND
REGULATION (1993).
19
The above discussion is based on Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda, supra note 12, at
256-65. For detailed discussion of the procurement principles, see generally SUE ARROWSMITH, JOHN
LINARELLI & DON WALLACE, JR., REGULATING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (Kluwer Law International 2000).
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bids.20 In some jurisdictions, negotiations between government and bidders
are banned in the sealed bid procedure, which usually means that the
government cannot go to the lowest bidder and ask for a lower price.21 To
be contrasted with sealed bidding is a request for proposals method of
procurement, where no bid opening occurs, but instead a closing date for
submission of confidential proposals, which are then evaluated in secret by
the government, although they are still required to be evaluated in
accordance with evaluation criteria published in a request for proposals
issued by the procuring entity. In a request for proposals procedure, the
government may negotiate with proposing firms, and will typically apply
significant discretion in evaluating technical merit and in trading off
technical merit against cost in determining which proposing firm is offering
“best value.” We can contrast the sealed bidding and request for proposals
methods of procurement with a wholly unstructured negotiated approach
mirroring what might happen in some private sector contexts, in which the
purchasing agent has maximum discretion, and in which there are few
constraints on the structure of the offer and acceptance process leading to
contract award.
An important question for governments, taxpayers or other interested
parties in a procurement context – what in economics are called
“principals” – is whether procurement officials – the “agents” – have
conducted procurements efficiently.22 This is a difficult question to answer
because the principals have less information than the agents about how
procurements are actually conducted. Principals want to monitor agents to
determine whether the agents are making efficient procurement awards, but
they lack adequate information to determine whether procurements are
actually conducted efficiently. Governments have developed proxy
variables to assess efficiency, much like variables that were developed by
the insurance industry to evaluate risk. It is costly for insurance companies
to determine whether an insured is actually careful, so they do not base
insurance terms on the actual care exercised by the insured. Rather,
insurance companies use proxies that focus on results and statistics, such as
numbers of accidents or claims, smoker versus non-smoker, young male
versus other drivers, and other such information which can facilitate

20

In some jurisdictions, sealed bidding can only be used along with an evaluation criterion
requiring award on the basis of lowest price or cost. ARROWSMITH, LINARELLI & WALLACE, supra note
19, at 674-79.
21
Id. at 488-503.
22
There can be a number of principals in the public procurement context. The principal can be
taxpayers or ministers. In procurements financed by a development bank such as the World Bank,
the principals can be the bank shareholders, the bank's directors, the bank itself or even the
taxpayers in the shareholder countries.
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separating equilibria in the insurance market.23 Similar conditions hold in
public procurement. It is costly for principals in the procurement context to
determine whether procurement agents are actually efficient, so they do not
actually evaluate efficiency in procurement. They instead use proxies. For
example, sealed bidding is easier to monitor than the request for proposals
or negotiated methods of procurement. In a sealed bid context, the question
whether a procurement is conducted efficiently is answered simply by
asking whether the agent has followed the mandatory rules set out in the
law. If she has, then the procurement is efficient. This analysis seems to
explain a number of legal rules used in public procurement systems. It
explains why the World Bank and the regional development banks maintain
a strong preference for sealed bidding and ban negotiations in bankfinanced procurement. The development banks do not have the resources to
conduct comprehensive audits, evaluations or investigations of the many
procurements they finance, so they accept that if the sealed bid procedure is
used properly, then by definition, bank funds are being spent properly.
What I have explained thus far, I have named the “information rationale”
for transparency in public procurement.24
In addition to providing for less costly monitoring of procurement
agents, formal methods of procurement, such as sealed bidding, provide
procurement agents, who, unlike their private sector counterparts, are not
constrained (or are constrained less) by market forces, with less discretion.
The economist Armen Alchian has explained this “incentive rationale” for
procurement rules.25 Alchian's incentive rationale is the traditional rationale
for procurement law. The incentive rationale focuses on the need for tried
and tested procurement methods in lieu of reliance on procurement officials
making their own decisions. The incentive rationale is the weaker rationale
because it fails to account for the fact that in the right circumstances,
government officials have reputational, career and programmatic incentives
to be efficient. Both the incentive rationale and the above information
rationale, and particularly the informational rationale, support formalism
and legalism in public procurement, when it is necessary to preclude or at
least mitigate moral hazard in procurement. Moral hazard is the problem of
unobservable or hidden action that may occur during the procurement
process, when the behavior of an agent conducting the procurement is
insufficiently observable.
A significant policy base for the rules in the UNCITRAL Model
Procurement Law is the promotion of transparency in public procurement.
23

See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979).
Linarelli, supra note 12, at 258-59.
25
Armen Alchian, Electrical Equipment Collusion Why and How, in ECONOMIC FORCES
259-69 (Armen Alchian ed., 1977).
24

AT
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The Model Law is loaded with procedures to facilitate monitoring of
government officials. If we examine UNCITRAL’s work in drafting and
revising the Model Law, we see that the information and incentive
rationales for transparency in procurement regimes are at work. Let us take
a look at the latest round of discussions of the working group, which
occurred in at the United Nations in New York on April 24-28, 2006. One
of the more substantive areas of discussion in that session was on the
inclusion of provisions in the Model Law to deal with electronic reverse
auctions or ERAs for short. The Note by the Secretariat, upon which
discussions were based, explained, among other things that “the main issue
for consideration is whether the ERA should include non-price criteria that
are qualitative and not quantifiable.”26 The Secretariat explained that two
models existed for electronic reverse auctions. In the first model, labeled
Model 1, “all aspects of the bids that are to be evaluated in selecting the
winning supplier are to be submitted through the auction. These criteria are
the price alone, or the price and price-equivalents that can be expressed as a
percentage of price or in figures.”27 In the second model, labeled Model 2,
there is a
pre-auction assessment of all elements of the initial bid or of
those elements not to be submitted to the auction, following
which suppliers are ranked, and their rankings communicated to
them. All evaluation criteria are then factored in a mathematical
formula, which would then re-rank the bidders on the
submission of each bid during the auction itself.28
So, Model 1 resembles the typical sealed bid procedure, in which only
price and price-related factors are evaluated, and what is evaluated are the
“bids” submitted through the electronic auctioning process. Model 2, on the
other hand, involves “more complex procedures that allow criteria other
than price to be subject to auction,” in which “a formula is to be used to
quantify the non-price or non-price-equivalent elements to be presented.”29
Though the Secretariat found it “implicit in the use of a formula that the
non-price or price-equivalent elements are expressed as a figure,
percentage, or otherwise numerically” the Secretariat suggested that the
Working Group “consider whether it is realistic to make an assumption that
26

Note by the Secretariat, Possible Revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of
Goods, Construction and Services – Drafting Materials for the Use of Electronic Reverse Auctions
in Public Procurement and Addressing Abnormally Low Tenders, A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.43 (Feb. 15,
2006). This and other UNCITRAL documents can be found at, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model.html (last visited July 7, 2006).
27
Id. ¶ 28.
28
Id. ¶ 29.
29
Id. ¶ 31.
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non-price or non-price equivalent criteria can be so expressed in a clear and
transparent manner.”30 The Model 2 approach is one adopted by the new
European Union Directives. As the UN Secretariat has explained:
The new European Union Directives make provision for such
non-price criteria to be subject to auction, but the Secretariat has
been able to locate very limited examples of such auctions
conducted in practice so as to examine their effectiveness. In
those encountered, non-quantifiable criteria were assessed using
a points system. For example, the technical and commercial
aspects of the tender in one case were assessed out of a score of
6000, and each such point was converted using an “exchange
rate” of 2500 to equate price reductions with the additional
value provided by the non-price assessment points (the latter
included such matters as management of subcontractor and the
ability to deal with unusual incidental aspects of the contract,
such as archaeological constraints). In another case, the value of
risk transferred back to the procuring entity from minor tender
noncompliances and caveats was weighted in cash terms (so
doing is relatively straightforward if the risk can be insured, but
in other cases may be difficult).31
Though the second, more complex and less transparent approach is the
subject of the new European Union Directives and hence may be the
subject of European practice now and in the future, a number of the
delegates seemed uncomfortable with the level of discretion Model 2
affords to procurement officials. The result of the discussions to-date is a
more conservative, less discretionary and more transparent approach. The
Secretariat reported the sentiments of the delegates as follows:
It was pointed out that in drafting any provisions on electronic
reverse auctions (ERAs) in the Model Law and the Guide,
conditions in and interests of countries that would primarily
benefit from the Model Law should be kept in mind. It was
pointed out that the Model Law had promoted so far traditional
open tendering as a “gold standard”, whose fundamental
principles included prohibition of negotiations and a single
opportunity for a supplier to submit its best tender, which were
contradicted by the inherent features of ERAs. Acknowledging
and regulating ERAs in the Model Law could mean deviation

30
31

Id.
Id. ¶ 32.

72

AJWH

[VOL. 1:317

from these fundamental principles and dilution of the “gold
standard” of open tendering.32
So, the option is to produce an electronic reverse auction procedure
that is more transparent. A more transparent procedure appears to mean one
that resembles sealed bidding more closely. The Working Group took into
account, among other things, the position of the multilateral development
banks on the question. The development banks tend to prefer more formal
procedures in the nature of sealed bidding.33 The Secretariat expressed the
collective view that the risks inherent in electronic reverse auctions should
be mitigated through regulation.34 So, the Working Group considered a
number of procedural safeguards designed to maximize transparency in the
electronic reverse auction process. “Anonymity of bidders and clear
specifications established and made known to suppliers at the outset of
procurement were named as such important considerations.”35 As well,
“[e]xperience with ERAs in at least one jurisdiction, it was said, indicated
that they might be a costly tool for procurement of demands for only one
procuring entity as third-party contractors were hired. Therefore,
consolidated purchases were encouraged.”36 Price is to be the only
evaluation criteria to be used, making the electronic reverse auction very
much like a sealed bid procedure:
The initial preference was that the provisions should be drafted
in such a way as to allow the price to be the only award criteria
when ERAs were used. Allowing criteria other than price would
open the possibilities of abuse as a subjective element could be
introduced into the process when trying to quantify these
criteria.37
In addition, the delegates expressed the view “that establishing the
lowest price below which tender would not be accepted could be an
important safeguard for a proper management of ERAs and against
abnormally low tenders.”38

32

Report of Working Group I (Procurement) on the Work of its Ninth Session, ¶ 87, A/CN.9/595
(May 8, 2006).
33
Id. ¶ 88.
34
Id.
35
Id. ¶ 89.
36
Id. ¶ 90.
37
Id. ¶ 91.
38
Id.
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Some delegates were of the view that only “standard goods and
commodities” should be the subject of electronic reverse auctions.39 The
Secretariat has explained the various views as follows:
The point was made that even standard services (for example,
cleaning services) could have qualitative elements and therefore
procurement through ERAs could compromise quality. On the
other hand, it was stated that it would not be desirable to limit
ERAs to any particular type of procurement as at this stage it
would be difficult to predict how the tool would evolve. As
experience in some countries suggested, services were capable
of being procured through ERAs even when quality mattered
with a two phase approach, the first phase involving the
assessment of quality aspects.40
Throughout the discussion, the countervailing arguments for and
against Models 1 and 2 procedures were discussed. Some delegates were
not entirely convinced that transparency required only a Model 1 approach.
As the Secretariat has explained, “[a] number of objections were raised to
providing exclusively for Model 1 ERAs as they presupposed a fully
automated process, which especially at a transitional stage in development,
could not be achieved without the risk of excluding a substantial number of
suppliers.”41
The delegates agreed that electronic reverse auctions should be a
“stand-alone procurement method, to avoid prejudicing their evolution,”
but also acknowledged that they could be an “optional phase” in some
procurement methods.42 The current proposed text for a new method of
procurement known as electronic reverse auctions, seen as a “compromise
solution, drafted in a sufficiently broad and flexible manner to allow
evolution of ERAs within a number of parameters,”43 is the following:
Article [36 bis]. Conditions for use of electronic reverse
auctions
A procuring entity may engage in procurement by means of an
electronic reverse auction in accordance with article [s 47 bis
and ter] in the following circumstances:
(a) Where it is feasible for the procuring entity to formulate
detailed and precise specifications for the goods, construction
and services;
39

Id. ¶ 92.
Id.
41
Id. ¶ 93.
42
Id. ¶ 94.
43
Id. ¶ 96.
40
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(b) Where there is a competitive market of suppliers or
contractors that are anticipated to be qualified to participate in
the electronic reverse auction such that effective competition is
ensured;
(c) Where it concerns (i) commonly used goods, the
characteristics of which are generally available on the market;
or (ii) commonly used services or constructions, the
characteristics of which are generally available on the market
and provided that the services or constructions are of a simple
nature; and
(d) the price is the only criterion to be used in determining the
successful bid; or
(e) [option for the legislator:] the price and other criteria that
can be expressed in figures or transformed into monetary units
and can be evaluated automatically are to be used in
determining the successful bid.44
It is clear from this tentative provision and its discussion, that the new
procedure promotes the information and incentive rationales that justify
transparency in public procurement.
There were some dissenting views in the UNCITRAL session,
preferring more flexibility in the new procedure. “An observation was that
the proposed text favoured price considerations at the expense of quality
and that the approach should be reconsidered.”45 The response was that
“that situation was inherent in ERAs and thus in procurement where quality
was more important than or equal to price, other procurement methods
might be more suitable.”46 One possible solution to the problem of ensuring
that electronic reverse auctions be as transparent as practicable is to explain
their use and their risks in the Guide to Enactment.47
The point I am trying to make in this discussion is that the UNCITRAL
Model Procurement Law takes a conservative approach to procurement,
focusing on the traditional procurement disciplines, which promote
transparency and hence economic efficiency. Given that the intended
constituency of the Model Procurement Law is countries in need of
procurement law reform – principally developing countries and countries in
transition from socialism – the conservative approach is appropriate
because what needs to be developed in the procurement systems of these
countries is widely held competencies – good procurement practices, based
44
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on time-tested procurement disciplines. Ultimately, to take the reasoning to
its logical conclusion, it is not just about drafting and promulgating
legislation on the books, but about developing capacities to conduct
procurement based on the disciplines found in the Model Law.
The formalism and legalism prevalent in the UNCITRAL Model Law
is not without tradeoffs.48 There may be cases in which legal rules imposing
formality in public procurement, and the resulting loss of discretion in the
hands of procurement officials, may mean that a procuring entity is forced
to achieve transparency at the expense of good business practice. Anyone
experienced in procurement practices can cite the examples. But as a
general matter, all things being equal, we want procurements to be more
rather than less transparent.
Two models of procurement governance have emerged from the efforts
of the last decade or so to develop and improve public procurement
systems. These models relate directly to the above institutional analysis.
Some of these efforts come from the need to distinguish public from private
contracting in countries transitioning to market oriented economies. In
some cases their purpose is to bring procurement systems up to
international standards in response to attention from the World Bank and
other international institutions. In the past I have divided these models into
two, the developed country model and the developing or transitioning
country model, though this terminology may not be sufficiently general.49
The terminology can be generalized to classify according to the level of
sophistication of the procurement regulatory regime in a country, regardless
of the income level of the country. The two models can be described as a
“mature” procurement systems model, which I designate as model 1, and
an “emerging” procurement systems model, which I designate as model 2.
In model 1 systems, governments have a significant degree of power to
provide incentives for contractor compliance with procurement rules and
contract terms. In model 1 systems, a high degree of professionalization of
the procurement workforce exists, and adequate remuneration for
procurement officials through an established civil service system. The
professionalization of the workforce is due in substantial part to years of
costly investment in the human capital of civil service employees. Model 1
systems include substantial criminal and quasi-criminal investigative
institutions complementing significant procurement regulatory institutions.
In countries with model 1 systems, substantial levels of monitors exist in
the form of internal enforcement bodies whose functions are to deter fraud,
waste and abuse. In addition to such internal enforcement institutions, some
countries have privatized enforcement in bid challenge or bid protest
48
49

The above discussion is based on Linarelli, supra note 12, at 259-60.
The above discussion is based on id. at 264-65.
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systems that permit interested parties (typically disappointed offerors) to
protest procurement actions that they claim violate procurement law. In
model 1 systems, procurement by open procedures or by sealed bidding is
not the norm. Effective enforcement institutions and a well-trained and
well-compensated bureaucracy make less transparency a worthwhile tradeoff for enhanced discretion and flexibility.
The procurement systems in the countries meeting model 1
characteristics contrast markedly with procurement systems meeting model
2 characteristics. Many of the features of procurement law and practice in
model 1 systems tend either to not exist in model 2 systems, or tend to exist
at only the early stages. A commonly held view is that countries with
model 2 systems are not yet in a position to use, at least extensively,
informal procurement procedures. The implementation of a model 1 system
would require the fundamental reform of judiciaries, legislatures and
bureaucracies, something that cannot be forthcoming immediately in some
countries, especially in developing countries and countries with transition
economies. Enforcement institutions do not exist or are deficient in model 2
systems. Model 2 systems rely relatively more on the transparency of
procurement procedures to facilitate monitoring of procuring entities and
contractors. Open competitive bidding, which provides more transparency
than methods of procurement based on requests for proposals or
negotiation, tends to be the norm. A commonly held view is that bidding
promotes a number of procurement disciplines that are fundamental to good
procurement practice and that should be mastered before taking on
procurement through requests for proposals or negotiation.
The above analysis is not intended to suggest that procurement officials
in countries with mature procurement regulatory systems are noble and
public interest minded and that their counterparts in countries with
emerging procurement regulatory systems are venal and corrupt. As we
well know, corruption in the procurement systems of developed countries
can be widespread.50 Moreover, it is not a matter of culture but of context
and incentives. The point is that principal-agent monitoring relies on
established legal and bureaucratic institutions that do a good job at aligning
the incentives of procurement agents with those of their principals.

III. TEMPERING EFFICIENCY WITH FAIRNESS: GPA MARKET ACCESS
In an article I wrote in 2001, I called the GPA a “failure of
cooperation” because of its limited “club” membership.51 At the time, there
50

Schooner, supra note 2.
Linarelli, supra note 12, at 235. The focus of my criticism was on the limited number of WTO
members who are GPA contracting parties. An alternative measure suggested to me, the value of
procurements liberalized, would have produced a more optimistic assessment of the GPA. Id. at
51
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was some optimism about the development of the transparency framework
agreement, though that project has since been discontinued.52 I would like
to retract my “failure” conclusion. With the pressure of the United States
and other WTO members, it seems the GPA is to have broader participation
in the future. At the current time, nine WTO members are negotiating for
accession to the GPA. They are: Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Jordan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Oman, Panama, and Chinese Taipei.
Moreover, the Protocols of Accession of a further six WTO members say
something about eventual accession to the GPA. These WTO members are:
Armenia, China, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Mongolia and Saudi Arabia. China recently confirmed that it will formally
begin the accession process by submitting an accession offer under GPA
Appendix I by the end of 2007.53
Some of these WTO members have relied on the UNCITRAL Model
Law to reform their procurement systems.54 Both the GPA and the
UNCITRAL Model Law promote transparency. The transparency
characteristics of the UNCITRAL Model Law promote trade liberalization
because they facilitate monitoring of commitments of the GPA contracting
parties by each other. The same principal-agent reasoning discussed above
in the domestic context applies in the international context. To the extent
that the GPA text contains similar principles – and it does – these principles
facilitate monitoring by GPA contracting parties. The GPA implements the
information rationale discussed above. The GPA sets forth detailed
“positive” rules with which GPA contracting parties are required to
comply.55 The aim of the GPA is to harmonize domestic procurement rules,
for public procurements to which the GPA applies. For procurements to
which the GPA applies, GPA contracting parties are obligated to conform
their domestic procurement rules to GPA requirements. Positive rules are to
be distinguished from negative rules, which require countries to comply
with WTO obligations, but leave it to the members to decide how
235 n.1.
52
See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
53
See Anderson, supra note 13.
54
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compliance will be achieved.56 In this sense, the GPA was ahead of its time.
This sort of positive rule making did not occur in earnest in the multilateral
trading system until the Uruguay Round; its most prominent example is the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.57 The
positive rules in the GPA text may form part of the reason why the GPA
participation base has been so limited.
The text of the GPA itself – the part detailing requirements on how
procurements are to be conducted – can be conceptualized as the nonmarket access provisions of the GPA.58 The market access provisions are
the all-important annexes, which the GPA contracting parties negotiate.
While the non-market access provisions could be said to promote
transparency, the market access provisions could be said to promote
fairness. This may seem an odd conclusion, but here is the explanation.
The GPA market access provisions promote fairness to the extent that
they give GPA contracting parties the ability to promote social justice and
to intermediate the effects of globalization on public contracting markets,
and to the extent that some level of protection forms part of a legitimate
political consensus within the constitutional systems of GPA contracting
parties who choose to follow such a route. For example, if a GPA
contracting party maintains a policy of repair to remedy past actual or
societal discrimination against certain groups, then it can withhold market
access for some procurements designated for these groups, by not putting
those procurements on the table for coverage by the GPA. The United
States does something like this for its substantial minority and small
business programs.59 Two stories have been told about so-called
preferences in public procurement.60 Both stories contain a number of
truths, though the stories themselves are oppositional to some extent, one
describing a case of justice and the other a case of economic waste.
First, I provide the “good” story about preferences. Preferences
promote social justice for disadvantaged groups. In some countries, they
are intended to mitigate historic injustice, situations in which past policies
made favored groups better off while making disfavored groups worse off.
56

Linarelli, supra note 12, at 236-37, for a discussion of these issues.
See Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the
TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 166-67 (2000).
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I am grateful to Robert Anderson for the market access and non-market access terminology.
59
The U.S. Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limitations on such “set asides.” See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). (The claim made by the petitioner,
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This is the policy of repair approach mentioned above. Some scholars have
named such an approach a trade stakeholder model.61 Such a model values
broad participation by domestic constituencies in trade policy, at both the
domestic and international levels. It is a model of deliberative democracy in
which social justice is taken into account as a variable separate from
economic efficiency. In the good story, domestic interest groups are
important and are cast in a positive light. In the good story, interest groups
in an open and transparent policymaking process promote diversity and the
achievement of a broad overlapping consensus for public policy.
In the good story, as a matter of fairness, WTO members should retain
the ability to develop programs to promote participation in public
procurement by members of all segments of their societies, including
programs such as domestic preferences, set asides, and procurement
assistance for small and minority owned firms. Procurement is recognized
as having important social policy implications. The good story accepts that
the social consensuses reached within the domestic constitutional systems
of the WTO members may produce states of affairs in which certain social
justice goals trump trade goals.
In contrast to the tightness of the GPA non-market provisions around
efficiency concepts, the market access provisions give the GPA contracting
parties “outs” by converting the GPA into an umbrella arrangement for a
series of negotiated arrangements liberalizing only those markets the WTO
members could liberalize without running afoul of fairness principles. The
non-market access provisions are subservient to the market access
provisions; they apply only to procurements liberalized in the annexes.
So far, the good story has been cast in ideal terms. In reality, the GPA
market access provisions permit the implementation of social justice
policies imperfectly and incompletely. The GPA market access provisions
allow GPA contracting parties to keep domestic preferences, provided they
can liberalize sufficient numbers and values of other procurements. The
United States does this; it opens up substantial procurement markets yet
also keeps substantial procurement markets closed, in order to maintain its
substantial preference programs. But here lies the potential problem. The
extent of a GPA contracting party’s autonomy to pursue its own domestic
social justice goals is a function of its ability to offer up on the GPA
negotiating table substantial other procurements unaffected by preference
programs. Thus, in the GPA context, only contracting parties with
substantial import markets in public procurement have substantial policy
autonomy. The bottom line is that a GPA contracting party needs market
power to implement its own social justice goals in its own municipal legal
61

See, e.g., G. Richard Schell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory An Analysis of
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system. The first story thus has a mixed ending, though this is not
controversial, since theories of justice do not easily extend beyond the
nation state even in ideal terms.62
The second or “bad” story about preferences is that they are wasteful
and in some cases unjust. Perhaps the bad story simply brings a measure of
realism to the good story. The bad story is that some governments have
used public procurement as an enclave in which politics predominates over
market-based considerations, to protect favored industries or even to
dispense patronage to political friends. In the worst case, corruption diverts
scarce public resources to socially wasteful contracts. The result is the
typical litany of public policy ills, “corruption, inefficiency, political
capture, rent seeking, protectionism, inflated costs, and the development of
cartels.”63 Interest groups are cast in a negative light, as rent seekers. Even
without corruption, there is evidence to suggest that preference and other
programs that limit competition in procurement are inefficient, poorly
suited to the policies they are designed to implement, fail to help the
constituencies they are ostensibly intended to help and can do more harm
than good.64 A major concern in the bad story is that protectionism will be
institutionalized by what is not liberalized in the GPA market access
provisions.65 In the bad story, the GPA market access provisions have the
potential to create a protected enclave of interest groups that make the GPA
very difficult to change in a significant way, and thus procurement markets
become very difficult to liberalize.
Which story is true? Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between these
two stories. Which version of the story one accepts depends on one’s
training and perspective. One can take a nonreductionist view and argue
that elements of truth can be found in both stories. The good story accepts
both direct and collateral policies as legitimately pursued in public
62

There is a substantial literature on the application of theories of justice beyond the domestic
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procurement.66 Direct policies have to do with buying goods, construction
and services on the most efficient basis practicable. The focus is solely on
value for money. Collateral policies have to do with pursuing social
policies outside of value for money, realizing that some social policies
come at a social cost, so long as a political consensus exists on such polices
and their costs to society. Of course, what is one WTO Member’s social
justice is another’s protectionism. WTO Members have no obligations to
accept one another’s social justice policies.

IV. CONCLUSION
Merryman was right. We need to keep doing more inquiry about public
procurement law and policy. More inquiry might lead to greater
understanding and appreciation of the importance of public procurement in
both domestic and international legal contexts. As I have tried to explain
above, a number of substantial policy issues relate to the operation of
public procurement at both the domestic and international levels. These
policy issues relate not only to good governance and to the efficiency of
markets, but also to fairness and social justice in civil societies.
Based on the above account, two areas seem especially fruitful for
further study. First, as for domestic law reform in countries in need of
improving their procurement systems, it would seem that the focus should
be on capacity development and not just on the production of law and
regulation. The law on the books offers little by itself; it is the law in action
– the competencies of procurement officials in actually conducting
procurement – that matter most. I think that much of UNCITRAL’s focus
on developing transparent principles relates to the need for competencies in
basic procurement disciplines. The rules enacted are designed to direct
procurement officials toward core procurement competencies. Second,
efforts to broaden participation in the GPA have the potential to expose the
rock face of globalization. Without further inquiry, it is unknown at this
time, but it would seem that at least as an area for further inquiry that the
GPA market access negotiations, in the right cases, has the potential to tell
us in stark relief how the domestic policy autonomy of smaller states is
effected by international obligations. What we find out remains to be seen,
but these are interesting times, as the GPA broadens its participation base.
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